The article lists settings to change on Android 14 and iOS 17.

According to the author:

Recommended setting changes reduce the amount of data submitted to device manufacturers, cell carriers, or app developers and improve device security against common threats, such as those posed by nosy people who find the device unattended or by common malware.

By enabling all of these settings, you are significantly reducing the amount of tracking and data collection these devices perform, but keep in mind that you are not completely eliminating it.

  • INeedMana@lemmy.world
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    10 months ago

    I think this article is so-so. For example

    • Display: Screen timeout: Shortest duration you are comfortable with
    • Wallpaper & style: Set your lock screen to something generic and non-personal (no family photos, etc)
      (…)
    • Security & Privacy: Device Unlock: Screen lock: Strong password preferred, followed by PIN, then Pattern.
    • Security & Privacy: Device Unlock: Screen lock settings: Enhanced PIN privacy: Enabled
    • Security & Privacy: Device Unlock: Screen lock settings: Lock after screen timeout: Shortest duration you are comfortable with

    These don’t affect “the amount of tracking and data collection these devices perform”. Might be good ideas in themselves, but bundling these with options that really diminish the amount of data broadcasted, washes the picture out IMO

    • ForgottenFlux@lemmy.worldOP
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      10 months ago

      The settings you’ve highlighted do improve device security against common threats, such as those posed by nosy people who find the device unattended, as I’ve mentioned in the post.

      • cjf@feddit.uk
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        10 months ago

        So if an iPhone gets stolen, would having Find My completely disabled actually be a bad thing if we’re trying to improve device security? I see that’s listed in the article.

        Would this affect the ability to use the remote lock & wipe functionality?

        • ForgottenFlux@lemmy.worldOP
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          10 months ago

          The setting you’re mentioning i.e., Apple ID > Find My: Disable everything1 has superscript i.e., 1 attached to it. The superscript leads to the following note:

          1: Some people prefer to leave “Find My iPhone” enabled as it allows them to remotely wipe the device if it gets lost. However, due to enabling the “Erase Data” setting, I don’t believe this is necessary. If it makes you feel better or if you have a specific use case for it, you can leave this feature on, but “Share My Location” should still be disabled (unless you use need to use it often) as this feature will report your location back to Apple regularly.

          I’m not the writer of the article, but I think that this note makes it clear that you can configure this setting according to your threat model.

      • INeedMana@lemmy.world
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        10 months ago

        And I was commenting on the article. Which only has two lists and at the bottom

        By enabling all of these settings, you are significantly reducing the amount of tracking and data collection these devices perform, but keep in mind that you are not completely eliminating it.

        And I’m criticizing that

        • ForgottenFlux@lemmy.worldOP
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          10 months ago

          You make a valid point. As I’m not the writer of the article, perhaps it would be apt to convey your feedback to the writer.

    • ForgottenFlux@lemmy.worldOP
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      10 months ago

      I’m not the writer of the article, but here’s an answer you can find on running a quick search.

      According to this article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF):

      What is 2G and why is it vulnerable?

      2G is the second generation of mobile communications, created in 1991. It’s an old technology that at the time did not consider certain risk scenarios to protect its users. As years have gone, many vulnerabilities have been discovered in 2G and it’s companion SS7.

      The primary problem with 2G stems from two facts. First, it uses weak encryption between the tower and device that can be cracked in real time by an attacker to intercept calls or text messages. In fact, the attacker can do this passively without ever transmitting a single packet. The second problem with 2G is that there is no authentication of the tower to the phone, which means that anyone can seamlessly impersonate a real 2G tower and your phone will never be the wiser.

      Cell-site simulators sometimes work this way. They can exploit security flaws in 2G in order to intercept your communications. Even though many of the security flaws in 2G have been fixed in 4G, more advanced cell-site simulators can take advantage of remaining flaws to downgrade your connection to 2G, making your phone susceptible to the above attacks. This makes every user vulnerable—from journalists and activists to medical professionals, government officials, and law enforcement.